vendredi 26 avril 2013

Vivendi 2012 annual results update


I already wrote about Vivendi several times :

in sept 2011 : here
updated mid 2012 : here

Vivendi published its 2012 annual results recently, so it's time for an update.
Besides some people apparently arrive on this blog after a google search on "vivendi value" so I feel more or less compelled to update.
However, if you look for a clear-cut investment thesis and a strong conviction, you'll not find it there, so you may want to skip this post in that case.

Intro

Vivendi 2012 annual result presentation is here.
You'd never know casually looking at the slides that earnings are down a whooping 94 % (see for instance slide #3 all those nice green check boxes).
I also love the expression "maximize SFR value". What is that supposed to mean ?


SFR CEO Frank Esser was fired in 2012 and Vivendi CEO Mr Levy himself stepped down mid 2012.
Both have left with 3.9 m€ golden parachute as disclosed in the financial report (note 25 Transaction with related parties).

Remember also that the dividend was cut in half last year and not restored since.

Now that I've vented some of my bitterness, I'll try to decide rationally what to do.


What happened ?

The reality (as I see it) is that SFR (mobile phone branch of Vivendi) margins have been steamrolled by the competition with Free (ticker : ILD). Free mobile has gained 5.2 million new clients in just one year. SFR had to lower its prices and create low-cost offers to stabilize its customer base. Same thing has happened to the telecom branch of Bouygues.

According to rumors, Vivendi is currently looking for a new CEO for SFR (5 managers in 5 years), a pretty good indication of the current malaise (I might as well use a French word from time to time).

Here is a graph with the stock price of Free (ILD) vs Vivendi (VIV) for the last 5 years, that speaks for itself.


If I take my personal example, I left SFR for Free mobile in 2011. As I previously explained, my bill went from 14.9 € to 2 € for 1 hour (enough for my needs).
Early 2013 Free mobile upgraded me from 1 to 2 hours, for the same 2 € ! A striking example of a 50% price deflation in stark contrast with other goods/services around me.

I'm a Vivendi client for my ADSL connection. They offered me spontaneously a 10% rebate on my monthly fee, as a loyalty bonus.

Mutliply that by a few million clients and obviously this is not good for the bottom line.


2012 financial results

Updated graph


CA = Chiffres d'Affaires = Sales
ROP = Operational Result

I don't take into account the adjusted EBIT published by Vivendi, which is always higher.


FCF = CFO (cash flow from operations) - CAPEX
LT debt = long term financial debt

Flat sales, margins are down, FCF down (heavy investments). Only positive aspect I see is LT debt is -at last- stabilized.
EV/current EBIT ~13, hardly cheap.


The net result is impacted by provisions and depreciations.
Equity is around 20 bn€, and goodwill around 25 bn€, so there are many "opportunities" for further depreciations in the future.
Sure enough, it's a non-cash loss, but I think it is misleading : see this link.


Analysis of a screw up


Can I reasonnably assess the "earnings" power of VIV ? Not really.

I can't predict the evolution of the telco industry in France (and the arrival of Free did significantly change the landscape).
Seems like operators are betting on the arrival of the 4G standard  to restore their margins, but large invesments are required and imho there's no guaranty hat a new price war will not resume after a few months.


This post (value and opportunity blog) clarifies (I think) the kind of mistake I made. I bought VIV in 2011 because it looked cosmetically cheap (based on recent past earnings) but without really understanding why. Obviously this is more difficult for a large company operating in different sectors, subject to relatively rapid changes.

To compound this, VIV is a large cap followed by many professional investors, so I have obviously no informational or analytical edge.


Insider trading


Insider trades taken from the AMF website, superposed on the graph of VIV stock.
Blue = buys
Red = Sells
Amonts in € (logarithmic scale).
I see no clear correlation here (ie no heavy buying at bottoms, no heavy selling either). Anyway nothing but buys since end 2010.
A recent significant buy from Bollore (800 k€ in march 2013) who as has a reputation of a shrewd operator. Also and maybe related, a recent operation by Bollore that I don't quite understand :
Bollore is borrowing 310 m€ using 17 millon Vivendi shares as collateral (so ~18.2 €/share) ?
What does it mean for Vivendi ?


Sum of parts analysis

Here is my own crude version.
Every professional analyst who follows VIV has probably a much more refined one, so I won't fool myself about any superior insight, but at least it gives me a rough idea.
All figures in m€.



Some subsdiaries (Activision, Maroc Telecom) of Vivendi are listed, so I just use the market cap (at the time the article was written).

Vivendi recently tried to sell GVT but no deal. I use for my valuation the highest rumored bid : around 6 €bn.

For SFR I used a simple comparison (EV/Sales ratio) with Belgacom, another telco (listed in Brussels) I happen to follow and France Telecom. I used the lowest valuation of the two.

For Canal+, EV/Sales comparison with M6 (ticker MMT), a French TV company I follow (I own a few MMT shares). Sure it's not the same business model (Canal+ is pay TV), but I wonder if/how he arrival of Netflix (not yet, but bound to happen sooner or later ?) on this market will impact C+.

For Universal media group, I just applied the same EV/EBITDA ratio of 7 (the same as the UMG/EMI deal) and slapped a 20 % discount on this, just in case UMG overpaid for the deal.

I substract the net debt and divide by the diluted number of shares.

I get ~20€/share for this sum of parts valuation.
In this article, the consensus average valuation was 19.35 €, a good agreement, but difficult to know if it's just a coincidence, without access to the analysts notes. In this article (in French), Soc Gen sum of parts valuation is 22 €.

Anyway  the current quote (~17 €) is a 15 % discount to 20 € which does not seem so large to me (I have in mind a 20-30 % "usual" holding discount here).

Conclusion

As I said, I have no edge here.
No obvious under evaluation.
No trust for management.
No hurry to sell either because of the discount to sum-of-parts analysis.
Vivendi has announced recently that it has received two offers for the sale of Maroc Telecom and the stock went up as a result.
I've sold part of my position at 17 € and will continue to do so when (if) the stock goes up. Otherwise no move.

lundi 18 février 2013

Total (FP) 2012 update

I 1st coved Total in August 2011 : see here.
The company has just published its 2012 results.
The company was (and is) extremely cheap on a PER or EV/EBIT basis and raised its dividend.

However my main concern at that time was that Total was, as stated by Jim Chanos for integrated oil companies, in "stealth liquidation".
To summarize Jim Chanos: "we are shorting oil majors. If you look at their accounts you will see that capital expenditure (CAPEX) consumes all the cash generated, yet their reserves and their sales have stagnated. This means that they borrow to pay their dividend. They are in fact in liquidation.
This did not stop me from investing at 32€, mainly for the hefty dividend yield (7%).
The stock is now around 37 €.

So is Total in "stealth liquidation" ?
Here is a graph with
- Operating cash flow (flux d'activité in French)
- CAPEX (more on that later)
- FCF = operating cash flow - CAPEX
- FCF - dividend
This last one turned negative in 2009 and stayed there.
Score one for Chanos.




Lets now look at :
- long term debt (left scale)
- production and reserves (right scale)
Debt climbs, flat production, flat reserves.
Shows also that all CAPEX can be considered as maintenance CAPEX (0 growth).

Score another one for Chanos.



Same graph but debt expressed as a % of equity (left scale).
Well debt does not seem to explode.



Summary :
The "liquidation" term seems rather excessive to me.
But a dividend durably exceeding FCF is imho unhealthy.
Standby for me, I don't know quite what to do !

jeudi 31 janvier 2013

GEA 2012 annual results

GEA has published its 2012 results.
The financial report is available here (in French).


Margins remain high (23 % op margin); no tangible sign of "mean reversion" as was (and still is) my main concern.
Modest sales growth, stable order backlog.


The balance sheet remains rock solid (40 m€ cash, 0 debt).
Working capital requirement shows a marked increase (large increase in accounts receivable) but I see not cause for concern.

In my previous article I had mentionned that GEA was not part of the "Ecomouv" consortium implementing a new tax for trucks ; but according the the latest report GEA will be a supplier after all.

I had also mentionned that Sanef had bought the transport branch of Communication and Systems (CS group), a comparable company. Finally the branch has been sold for 15 m€, around 0.5x 2012 Sales, or 10x 2011 operational result.


All in all, nothing very new.
Positives : strong balance sheet, profitable, cheap (EV/current EBIT ~3)
Negatives : slow growth, some indifference to shareholders (no special dividend, no share buybacks).

I've bought some more shares.


jeudi 10 janvier 2013

Bilan 2012

Meilleurs voeux à tous.
Best wishes to all, english translation of the following post to come...

2012 a plutôt été une bonne année boursière, et pour mon portefeuille également.
Mais une performance annuelle n'a pas beaucoup de sens je trouve. Difficile de faire la différence entre hasard et véritable discernement sur une si courte période.
D'autre part on avait fort mal commencé 2012, sur des perspectives de fin de l'€, de défaut de l'Espagne, de l'Italie, etc...Les valorisations étaient au plancher. Comme le pire n'est pas arrivé, tout est plus ou moins remonté, y compris les actions de mon portefeuille.

Je me méfie du consensus haussier de début 2013. Rien n'est véritablement réglé, et je pense que les résultats des sociétés ne vont pas s'améliorer cette année, bien au contraire. Donc prudence.
Ci-joint un mémo récent de Howard Marks. "I think this is a time for caution".



Pour moi, la "performance" est à réaliser lors de d'achat, en achetant les actions de la "bonne" société au "bon" prix (ou au bon moment), et surtout en utilisant le "bon" processus.

Je préfère donc passer rapidement en revue mes précédents posts (dans l'ordre chronologique) pour avoir une idée plus juste de mes "performances".

INFE : 58 € en Février 2011, 50 € fin 2011, 45 € fin 2012.
Pas brillant du tout, donc.
Les résultats se sont fortement détériorés mi 2012, mais la société a toujours un bilan en béton et une valorisation à la casse. La liquidité est quasi inexistante. On se demande bien ce que la société a l'intention de faire de son abondante trésorerie.
Je reste confiant, mais à surveiller de près. Je ferai un post à l'occasion des résultats annuels.

SAM Outillage (SAMP) : 32 € en Février 2011, vendu à 44-45 € fin 2011. Cours actuel 28 €.
Donc apparemment une bonne décision.
Je la surveille du coin de l'oeil, sans plus.

Total (FP) : 32 € en Aout 2011, allégé à 39 € fin 2011. Cours actuel 39 €.
Fond de portefeuille.

Vivendi (VIV) : 16 € en Septembre 2011. Cours actuel 16,4 €.
Toujours plus de dettes au bilan et guerre des prix avec Free. Départ du PDG. Succession de spéculations ce été sur la vente de telle ou telle division (Maroc Telecom, GVT, etc...). J'attends les résultats de 2012 pour décider.


Tessi (TES) : 62 € en Novembre 2011. Cours actuel 80 €.
Je reste confiant dans la société, même si les résultats seront en baisse je pense (problèmes dans la division Marketing, voir mon post ici).


Groupe CRIT (CEN) : Achetée 20 €, moyenne baisse à 14 €, et 11 €. Vendue partiellement à 15,9 € début 2013. Donc mauvaise décision initiale, meilleure ensuite. Pas mal d'acquisitions dans le travail temporaire aux US et des notes d'analystes favorables en ce début d'année.
J'ai allégé ma position car je n'ai pas de convictions très fortes. En plus la fiscalité de CRIT (taxe CVAE) est particulière et je l'avais sous-estimée dans mon analyse initiale.

LaCie (LAC) : Achetée 3,5 €, OPA de Seagate à 4,05 € (voir mon article ici), relevée ensuite à 4,5 €, mais Seagate n'a pas réussi à acquérir les 95 % nécessaires pour délister LaCie. Cours actuel 4,1 €. J'ai donc eu raison de ne pas apporter à l'OPA à 4,05 € et pour l'instant apparemment tort de ne pas apporter à celle à 4,5 €. Je ne desespère pas que Seagate améliore son offre pour pouvoir acquérir les actions qui lui manquent.


FFP (FFP) : 25 € en Juin 2012. Cours actuel 32 €.
Pour l'instant le marché me donne raison, mais je pense que FFP a simplement suivi la forte hausse de UG en ce début d'année (rachat de positions à découvert ?). Je vise une réduction de la décote de holding de FFP.

GEA (GEA) : 65 € en Septembre 2012. Cours actuel 72 €.
Un bon achat, donc. Mais toujours difficile pour moi de comprendre si les marges de GEA sont durables ou pas, et surtout pourquoi.
 





jeudi 6 décembre 2012

Mises à jour rapides GEA, TES

Quelques mises à jour

GEA a publié son chiffre d'affaires du 4è trimestre : ici
Le CA 2012 est donc pratiquement stable par rapport à 2011.
Plutôt bon signe, mais j'attends les résultats 2012 pour voir si la marge se maintient.

Tessi  (ou ici en anglais) a fait l'objet d'un intéressant article sur ce blog US ici.
J'ai une petite remarque sur sa conclusion :
"With ’12 earnings estimated in the €30-31 million range, Tessi should generate close to €40 million in FCF, for a yield of 20.1%".

Tessi a donné quelques perspectives sur ses résultats 2012 ici.
En clair : le chiffre d'affaires sur 9 mois est en baisse (186 vs 193).


La branche marketing perd de l'argent et sera réorganisée (charge non récurrente de 1,5 à 2 m€)
Le CA de la branche CPR OR ne sera pas à la hauteur de celui du 2ème semestre 2011, mais la marge devrait rester élevée.
La branche Documents semble en légère croissance.
Avec des extrapolations plus ou moins hasardeuses, je m'attends donc à un RN de 20-25 m€ plutôt que 30 m€.

D'autre part, le PDG Marc Rebouah a déclaré à l'AMF en novembre 2011 pas mal d'acquisistions d'actions Tessi à 71-73 € (voir le site de l'AMF), donc plutôt bon signe ?

Enfin dans les résolutions proposées à l'AG (voir ici), la société envisage d'emettre des obligations pour un montant de 20 m€, ce qui me surprend, compte-tenu de la grosse trésorerie excédentaire de Tessi. Y a t'il une acquisition majeure en préparation ?

Comme d'habitude, je me tâte pour renforcer ou attendre un hypothétique trou d'air.



dimanche 16 septembre 2012

GEA

 1. Intro

GEA (ticker : GEA) manufactures highway toll equipment. In my area (Escota highway network, owned by Vinci Group), almost every automatic toll I see is badged GEA.

The company has already been covered by several bloggers, which will spare me time :
- Actions ordinaires entreprises extraordinaires : Here and here (in French)
- Trying to be like warren : Here (in French and partially in English)
- The Red Corner : here (in English) , a very interesting and impressive analysis. I've added the blog to my blogroll.


To sum it up :
- GEA currently (for a quote of 65 €) trades at EV/EBIT ~ 2x, PER ~ 9 (2011 results)
- 2011 operating margin 22% (before taxes), 2011 ROE 22 %
- 0 debt, 40 m€ cash for a market cap of 78 m€, no goodwill
- order backlog covers more than 1 year of activity,
-  low maintenance CAPEX requirements

The company supplies 85 % of French motorways and has sold its toll systems in 33 countries worldwide.

All this sounds too good to be true and of course the question is : why is it so cheap ?

As pointed out by the Red Corner blog, there's a dramatic improvement of the business after 2007 (both sales and margins) : why ?



Another chart illustrating this (net result) :

The underlying issue of course is what will the future look like ? As pre-2007 (the current valuation is justified) or more like the recent years (then the current valuation is a bargain) ?

Second point : GEA is cheap because of its large cash position and absence of debt. Where will this cash go ?

2. Drivers behind the business improvement

I've read the annual reports but the management does not supply a clear explanation or I've missed it.
The Red Corner blog article  attributes this to international sales and a greater mix of services (maintenance,...) with a higher margin.


Here is what I found on my side.

What has driven the sales growth ?

Many highways went private in 2005 and embarked on an automatic toll collection program in the late 2000's. Here is an article giving the number of highway employees working in toll collection. The gain in productivity for highway companies is immediate and the return on this investment is quick.




Electronic toll collection  in French highways mainly relies on a DSRC (dedicated short range communication system) and a transponder or tag that is placed in the vehicle : Liber-t system in France (all highway operators use the same standard).

Other technologies have been developped (for instance satellite-based systems).
See for instance this neat presentation by Kapsch TrafficCom, a competitor of GEA (based in Austria)



For example according to this release, ~50 % of transactions on the APPR highway network are now made with this system and automatic transactions represent ~90 % of the total transactions. Almost all toll plazzas are now completely or partially automated.
So the market is probably saturated here.

In 2010 the highway companies signed with the Government a "green" investment program of 1 bn€ in exchange for a extended public concession time (so called "paquet vert" ="Green package") : article.  One of these investments is the immediate deployment of a 30 km/h drive-though toll in dedicated lanes; cars and trucks won't have to stop and restart, which reduces CO2 emissions.
GEA will benefit from this (see for instance GEA presentation here).

In 2013 all trucks will have to pay taxes on the national roads and smaller departmental roads : see link here. Apparently the system  involves "free-flow" tolling using overhead gantries and an on board unit (OBU). However I do not see GEA appear in the list of the Ecomouv company partners).


Free-flow tolling is the logical next step for highways and GEA should benefit from that.


In this article, there is an interview of Grigori Zass, the son of the company founder Serge Zass (in French).
A few items roughly translated :
- CAPEX requirements are low (~300 k€) but about 5 % of the salaries can be considered as R&D investments (1-2 m€/year)
- we were late in developping a "free-flow" system ; it was a mistake because it's the future and competitors are ready
- the French market remains central for GEA : few new highways are expected, but toll systems have to be maintained, upgraded every 3-5 years and replaced every 10 years "We live from this renewal/evolution market"
- export markets are difficult, especially China (local suppliers tried to copy their products). The product is 1st launched/tested on the French market, then made available for export
- same trend towards automatization on international markets
- in France the market has concentrated (more on that later)

Margins


GEA does not provide a breakdown of margins by business segment but its competitor Kapsch does :



Double-digit operating margins for services, extensions,... (recurring part of the business), much more fluctuating for the new projects (one-time effects). But of course you can't have the first business without the second.

I think this explains GEA 2005 loss. The 2005 annual report (loosely translated) says "this year an unusually high number of new pluri-annual contracts have been started, which significantly impacted the (net) result. The (positive) effects will be felt in 3-5 years".

I think that GEA currently benefits from long-term contracts signed a few years ago when French highways embarked on a large automatization program. I think this will slow down but the overall trend is positive.

Competitors and comparables


Main local competitor is the transport branch of group "Communication et Systemes" : link.
The Sanef group (itself a subsidiary of Spanish Group Abertis) has recently made an offer to buy the transport branch of CS, for a yet undisclosed amount.

Another French competitor is Thales (apparently it's a little more complicated because Thales has collaborated with GEA in the past to produce tags). Toll collection is just one of the numerous activities of Thales.
Another one is Multitoll  apparently a former subsidiary of Ascom group (Swiss), now independent.
Other competitors I could identify are Kapsch (already mentionned), Q-Free, from Norway, and SICE from Spain.
Kapsch and Q-Free are listed companies, SICE and Multitoll apparently not.

 See below the operating margins of competitor Kapsch (the 2011 surge in sales is linked to a major contract in Poland)


 The 2004-2011 average operating margin is around 10 % for GEA, 13 % for Kapsch, 5 % for Q-Free
According to the 2011 CS annual report, operational result 1.4 /sales 31 m€ = 4.5 % for the transport branch.
Multitoll is privately owned  but you can find some info here. Operating margins are around 4.4 %.


So I don't think that the current margins of GEA (>20 %) are sustainable in the future.

3. What will happen to the cash ?

GEA has 40 m€ in cash and 0 debt. What will happen to this cash ? Will it go back to ordinary shareholders ?

GEA is a small familial company, founded in 1970. The founder has 33 % of outstanding shares and more than 50 % of shareholder votes.
In the annual reports I have seen no trace of golden parachutes, free shares, stock-options, special retirement packages and related stuff. Management salaries seem very reasonnable.

The company pays a dividend (current yield 3.4 %), but there is no notable share buy-back program.

In the above mentioned article, Mr Zass states that GEA went to the stockmarket in 1994 to find capital to fund its exportation effort and that GEA independence is fundamental : "we wanted neither to sell our company to a larger group or to be indebted to banks".
Given this state of mind, I hardly imagine GEA giving this cash back to shareholders as a special dividend or a major share buyback. I think that GEA would need this cash in case of a large export contract, because cash flow can be very negative during some phases of the contract ; see for instance the free cash flow of Kapsch.


4. Conclusion

Ce que l'on conçoit bien s'énonce clairement. Et les mots pour le dire arrivent aisément.

In my case, just the opposite. I spent a long time writing and deleting this paragraph, which shows that I have a hard time reaching a clear conclusion.
All the bloggers mentionned at the beginning are very positive about GEA.

I'm not sure at all about extrapolating GEA recent results in the future (but 2012HY results are good ; some slowdown in sales but strong margins).

On the other hand, GEA valuation is very low compared to its competitors Kapsch and Q-Free. 2011 EV/EBIT ratios are around 16 for these two.
In 2008 it was possible to buy GEA at 10 €/share, an incredible deal offered by Mr Market (with the benefit of 100 % hindsight). Is it too late now ?

Insider trading : some buying by the family mid-2010 at around 40 €, nothing since.

A very simple DCF valuation (perpetuity) :


So the current price (around 65 €) is consistent with these assumptions :
- 0 growth
- 10 % EBIT margin (reversion to the mean)
- around 13 % required return / discount rate.
So am I willing to "buy" this company with reasonnably conservative assumptions about its future, and a return of ~13 % ? Yes. Do I have a large margin of safety ? Not sure.

Disclosure : long GEA.

mardi 26 juin 2012

FFP (English Version)

Version Française : voir ici

FFP is the main shareholder of the PSA Peugeot Citroen Group. The company belongs to the Peugeot family.

It also develops "a diversification portfolio, composed primarily of minority, significant and friendly holdings with a long-term shareholding approach, but also including private equity and real estate."

This porfolio is detailed in the 2011 annual report (in French only, apparently ; however their website is translated)

These diversification holdings are mostly outside the car manufacturing sector. These acquisitions have mainly been funded with dividends from the PSA group and a little debt.

Participations cotees = listed holdings
non cotees = non listed
capital investissement = private equity
immobilier = real estate



Largest listed holdings are Groupe Seb (home appliances) and Zodiac Aerospace. Zodiac Aerospace is doing very well, and the oulook for the aeronautical sector is good.

Peugeot PSA Group (ticker : UG), on the contrary, is facing difficulties. The stock is at an all-time low, and the whole sector is in crisis. The stock has lost 90 % in a few years and has taken FFP down with it.


Investment thesis (short version)

FFP calculates a Net Asset Value.


It is calculated from stock market prices at the end of the period for listed companies and for non-listed assets, a market value obtained by discounting cash-flows, or by applying different methods of multiples, mainly listed comparables multiples.



FFP last quote is under 30 €, a 50% discount to NAV.
Lets assume the Peugeot PSA group, second european carmaker (by units) in 2010 behind Volkswagen is worth 0.
NAV would still be around 36 €. FFP current price still offers more than 20 % discount in this case.

At the current price, you can buy a diversified basket of holdings and get Peugeot PSA group for free (sum-of-parts analysis).

You can also find this investment thesis here (Gurufocus article) or here (French value blog Super-Pognon, ~ Super-bucks in English !)

Investment thesis (long version)

I wanted to take a closer look at these holdings before putting my hard-earned and much-taxed savings on the table.
Sorry this is really long and tedious, but I see no other way around it.

Note that in 2008 NAV/share went down to 43 € (divided by 3 in 1 year !), which tends to show that the current NAV is not necessarily a lower value limit.
ANR par action  = NAV / share in English



Let's start with a word on Peugeot PSA group (ticker : UG)

The European market is saturated : 600 cars/1000 people and there is excess production capacity.
Buying a car can easily be postponed during a crisis ; besides there was a "cash for clunkers" program a few years ago.
Besides, Peugeot is doing poorly, caught between high-end German manufacturers and low-cost offers. Renault is doing better thanks to Nissan and low-cost brand Dacia (see articles here and here, in French).

Peugeot PSA shares are down 90 % over the last 5 years, 40 % losses so for this year.
In March 2012, PSA announced an alliance with General Motors, and carried out a capital increase (€ 1 billion, at a price of 8.27 € / share).
The company has sold its Paris headquarters, and its car-rental subsidiary Citer.

A few figures
Net income (in mio€) (excluding minority interests)
2009 losses amont to 1,161 m€.



Zoom over the last 5 years

CA = chiffres d'affaires = sales
ROP/CA = operating margin
FCF/CA = FCF/Sales
Dette nette = net debt



Stagnant sales, low operating margins (2-3%), heavy maintenance CAPEX, low FCF in good years.
When the margin is negative, the cash burning rate is impressive (~ -€2bn in 2011).

In 2011, operating income is positive, but manufacturing activities are still losing money (income comes from the car financing activity Banque PSA Finance and subsidiaries Faurecia and Gefco).
Long term debt almost doubled between 2008 and 2009, but remains (for now) limited to 25% of equity.

I calculated the Z-score of Peugeot. I get a Z-score of ~ 1.9 in 2011, the "red zone" (bankruptcy risk) is below 1.8 and that according to this website Ford Z-score is ~ 1.9. If I take the 2009 figures, the Z-score falls to 1.7. Moodys recently degraded the obligations of PSA to junk bond status.


I have a hard time imagining a bankruptcy of Peugeot PSA but the numbers are not brilliant, to say the least.


Current market cap is around €2.6bn, EV (taking into account debt and the recent capital increase) is about €5bn .
Some valuation ratios: P/B~0.2. Current PER~ 5.
EV / EBIT ~ 6. 13 year trailing PER is around 3 !

Always look on the bright side of life : for FFP, the disaster (massive depreciation of the main holding) has ALREADY occured.


The Peugeot Citroen PSA group includes :
- logistics group GEFCO, 40 % of sales outiside PSA Group. 2011 Sales 3.5 €bn and op income 223 €m. PSA has announced its intention to sell the shares, and the offers (private equity groups) range from 800 to 1200 m € (source : Les Echos, in French), so ~ 1/3rd of the current market cap of UG.


- 57 % of auto-parts (car seats, dashboards,...) maker Faurecia (ticker : EO). Only 17 % of Faurecia sales are done with the PSA Group, the 1st client is Volkswagen. Faurecia market cap is ~ 1.5 €bn, so PSA share is worth ~ 1/3rd of the current market cap.

So with FFP current valuation, you get Peugeot PSA for free, including Gefco and ~a half Faurecia.

I will not try to predict the long term future of Peugeot PSA : is it just a hiccup or the start of a permanent decline, like so many (too many ) industrial sectors in France (shipbuilding, refining, steel,...).
Anyway is Peugeot recovers, the upside on FFP stock is interesting. If not, the downside is I think limited.
The margin of safety consists of the other FFP participations, that we'll list below.

Note that some hedge funds are shorting PSA Peugeot stock (with some success, given the evolution of the price). Odey asset management (from the name of its manager Crispin Odey) : link to official AMF declaration.
See also this link from Aswath Damodoran on contrarian investing : Peugeot PSA group is among its top list of "losers" for the last 52 weeks

An article on Peugeot PSA in Gurufocus here

Diversification portfolio

There's a large number of companies in this portfolio and each one would require an entire post. Besides I acknowledge that my ressources/aptitudes are limited. So my objective is to have a look at each participation and make a conservative back-of-the enveloppe evaluation, to check that I'm not buying overvalued participations, and to better know FFP.

Lets start by listed holdings.

LISI (ticker FII) manufactures fasterners for the automotive, aerospace and medical (implants) industries. English financial report here. Sales are split equally between aerospace and automotive sectors, medical much smaller. According to the annual report, 2012 outlook is good for aerospace, ok for automative. Supplies mainly Airbus, but recent contract with Boeing. Automotive sells to all major european car manufacturers (strategic supplier of Daimler). Seems like a good business.
Mean ROE~10%. Last quote 45 €, EV/EBIT ~8, EV/EBIT (2006 to 2011 avg) ~ 8. P/B ~ 1.
Does not seem overvalued to me.

SEB group (ticker : SB) is a home appliance manufacturer. Well known brands Moulinex, Krups, Rowenta,. in Europe, I don't know if they are familiar in the US or elsewhere. Strong presence in emerging markets (acquisition of local brands and manufacturers). Only 20 % of sales in France and 38 % in western Europe.
Quote ~ 50 €. EV/EBIT ~ 8, EV/2002-2012 avg EBIT ~13. Decent margins, mean ROE ~ 20% pretty impressive. P/B~2.
The stock tanked to 20 € in 2008 and has strongly rebounded since.
Does not seem overvalued.

Zodiac aerospace (ticker ZC) makes aeronautical on-board systems, safety systems, aircraft seats,... See wikipedia article here. It's a blue-chip stock (favorable sector, niche market, probably protected with certification constraints in the aeronautical sector). Double digit margins, mid-teens ROE, sales growth. Valuation reflects this (80 €, up 40% this year, EV/EBIT ~ 14; PER ~20).
To be conservative, I'll take a much lower valuation (50 €, EV/EBIT ~10, knowing that 2011 was a record year for sales).

Orpea (ticker : ORP) is an European leader in clinics/nursing homes for elderly people (long term, especially for people needing physical/psychiatric care). English financial report here, investor presentation here. Double digit operating margins, probable barriers to entry (regulations, large investments), favorable market outlook with the greying of the European population, growth of revenue, results. But a spectacular run-up in debt to finance new buildings (~400 facilities total) and beds (~37000 beds, +10000 beds in 2 years) accross Europe.
For a last quote of 25€, 2011 PER ~17.
To be conservative, I'll take a much lower valuation (15€, PER~10). I use the PER, not taking into account financial debt because it's balanced by real-estate assets.

Ipsos (ticker : IPS) is a market research company (advertising research, opinion polls,...). Comparable to Nielsen in the US, albeit much smaller. Company motto is "Nobody's unpredictable". See wikipedia article here. English financial report here, investor presentation here. 43% of Sales in Europe. Pretty stable operating margin ~10 %. Growth, lots of acquisitions, and a major one in 2011 (Synovate, a UK company) which has sent the gearing up from 30 % to 66 %.
For a last quote of 25 €, PER = 13, EV/EBIT ~ 13, EV/avg 5 year EBIT ~13.
To be conservative, I'll take a much lower valuation (17 €, EV/ROP ~ 10).

Linedata (ticker : LIN) makes specialized sotfware for the financial/banking sectors. Linedata has launched a tender offer for 25.7 % of its shares at 16 €, and FFP has said they would sell their participation. 43% of the tendered shares have been repurchased.
For my evaluation, I take an average of 43%*16+(100-43)%*13 (last quote) = 14.3 €. FFP should receive some ~10 €mio in cash.

Let's now move to unlisted holdings

DKSH is a services company with a focus on Asia. DKSH has made an IPO this year. FFP has sold 35 % of its shares during this IPO, and made a nice profit (x3.2) on its initial investment. FFP keeps the remaining shares : see FFP press release here.
DKSH is now listed on the swiss stock exchange, and the 2011 financial report is available.
For a last quote of 51 CHF, entreprise value is ~ 3200 CHFm, for an EBIT of 237 CHFm. EV/EBIT ~ 13.
To be conservative, I take a lower valuation (38 CHF, around  30 €, EV/ROP ~ 10). If I'm not mistaken, FFP still holds around 4,360,000 DKSH shares.

Sanef operates 4 of 6 motorways providing access to Paris. Traffic is not about to plunge. FFP does not provide its evaluation of its stake in Sanef in 2011, but did it in the 2010 annual report : 135 m€. I do not have acess to Sanef accounts.


Is this a reasonable estimate?  Autoroutes Paris Rhin Rhone, a listed comparable company (ticker: ARR) has a market cap of € 4,700 m for 2011 sales of  € 2,022 m, a ~ 0.5 ratio.
If I apply the same ratio to 2011 sales of Sanef (€ 1,489 m), Sanef is worth ~ € 3 billion. FFP holds 5.1%, which gives a valuation of € 150m compared with € 135 m given by FFP end 2010.
I keep this figure for my evaluation.

Onet is a facility/multi services company (cleaning, logistics, services for the nuclear industry,..). FFP valued its stake in Onet around 97 m€ end 2010. I do not have access to Onet annual reports, but only to the data given by FFP on its website :


Onet would be worth 435 m€ for a net result of 18 m€, a PER of 24 of astronomical proportions for a company with meager margins. With the operating result, EV/ROP ~10 or 0.3x 2011 sales, more reasonable ratios.
Net margin decreased from 2.4% in 2010 to 1.3% in 2011. According to the FFP website, this is mainly due to a delay in passing through an increase in salary charges to customers.
A comparable listed company is Derichebourg (ticker : DGB), currently valued 6x its operational result and 0.3x sales. But the company is not directly comparable (DGB is mainly involved in recycling).


A direct competitor of Onet is ISS, based in Danemark. ISS publishes some figures but is a private company (owned by Goldman Sachs). Onet is 10x smaller than ISS, but apparently ISS is heavily in debt. Surfing on the net, you can find this pdf (evaluation of ISS done by Danish MBA students, with outside references). ISS would be worth between 40 to 50 DKKbn, EV/EBIT between 9 and 10.

To be conservative, I'll take an EV/EBIT ratio of 8 for Onet, a 20 % discount on FFP evaluation.


Chateau Guiraud makes wine (Sauternes). Valued 10 €m end 2010. Given the numerous and wild approximations I've already made for the other participations, it's negligible.

Private equity

IDI (ticker : IDIP) is a private equity company, listed on Euronext. Last quote is around 22 €, NAV 38 €/share according to the latest report. 40 % discount on NAV.
I take 22 € for my evalution.

Sagard, LBO France are unlisted private equity companies. Pretty opaque for me, even if I recognize some names in their holdings (such as excellent railway equiment Faiveley).
To be conservative, I'll brutally apply a 50% discount on their evaluation by FFP.

Real estate

Immobiliere Dassault owns ~10 buildings in Paris. Judging from the pictures and prime locations, seems like high-quality real estate. FFP evaluation relies on a professionnel appraiser.
To be conservative, I apply a 20 % discount on this appraisal.

Summary

The following table sums up my estimates compared to the NCAV published by FFP end 2011.
In a recent release, FFP announced that it had decreased its debt by 31 m€ (DKSH sale during IPO, but participation to PSA Peugeot capital increase).


Montant = amount
Cours = quote
Cours maintenant = latest stock quote
Cours retenu = retained (for the evaluation) stock quote



So to sum it up, FFP is still cheap even valuing its main asset for 0, and taking conservative (or so I hope) valuations for the other assets.
Besides, valuing Peugeot PSA at 0 makes little sense, because Gefco and Faurecia make up ~half of PSA current market cap).
Some hodlings are interesting for my portfolio allocation (aeronautics, exposure to Swiss Francs and emerging markets,...).


Why is FFP cheap ?

Pretty obvious reasons :
- low notoriety,
- FFP image = Peugeot + car maker + Europe France (even worse) ; I guess a fund manager normal reaction is not to touch it with a ten-foot pole ?
- lots of very different holdings => complicated valuation, risk of compound errors, holding discount
- scaring downward momentum
- no possibility of external takeover
- no control over capital allocation (the Peugeot familiy decides everything, you just ride shotgun, or more aptly in the rear trunk !)

Who is selling ?

I don't know. No signification insider selling or treshold crossing declared on the AMF website.

What's the upside potential ?

No precise idea. If the NCAV goes back to 2010 level, and the holding discount to a "normal" of 20-30 %, we're looking at a ~65 € target. That's a lot of  IFs.

Why am I publishing this ?

All right, I'm frigthened by the plunge of FFP shares. Maybe I've fallen to some psychological bias (confirmation bias, over confidence,...) or missed something vital. I'd love to hear (argumented) contrary opinions, and have an outside "reality check").
Comments welcomed. Otherwise, my email is in the contact page, thanks in advance..

Disclosure : long FFP.